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Introduction 
 The early nineties period saw substantial overhauling of Indian economy through 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which encompassed a number of measures viz. 
liberalization of export-import policy, drastic lowering of import duties on many products, 
removal of import restrictions, reduction of investment in agriculture and industrial sector so as to 
allow the private sector to take over, exchange rate adjustment, decanalisation and reduction in 
peak tariff rates besides abolition of export subsidies, improving competitiveness of Indian 
exports and integration of the national market with international market. However, some of these 
measures adversely affected the agricultural sector. The restructuring of the public distribution 
system had also an adverse affect on the availability of foodgrains to the poor at subsidized rates 
and this had substantial implications for the farm sector (Mathew, 2008).  
 The performance of Indian agriculture was not so encouraging in the aftermath of 
liberalisation as the decade of nineties and the period thereafter was marked with drastic decline 
in the growth rate of foodgrains, deceleration in the rate of growth of the GDP in agriculture and 
allied sector; which was just one percent during 2002-05, fall in per capita availability of 
foodgrains, import of foodgrains at a price higher than domestic price, rise in unemployment in 
agriculture sector, fall in prices of farm products, rise in input prices, etc. During the time when 
Indian agriculture was experiencing some serious concerns, the entire world got a major jolt by 
global financial and economic crisis. There were several underlying causes of the current global 
crises, which mainly revolved around: (a) prolonged boom in housing prices, (b) massive 
borrowing binge in the United States and some European countries, (c) rapid financial innovation, 
(d) growing culture of weak regulation, and (e) greed, fuelling the huge asset price bubbles in 
housing, stock markets and commodity prices (Acharya, 2009). The fall in US housing prices in 
the winter of 2006-07 rendered many of the “sub-prime” (not credit worthy) housing loans as bad 
loans, which meant hundreds of billions of financial derivatives to loose their value, resulting in 
collapse of “the house of financial cards” by the summer of 2007. The financial meltdown of 
September 2008 led to sharp slowdown in economic activity in the US and Europe with a massive 
drop in demand for goods and services from major exporting nations like China, Japan, Germany 
and other Asian countries, including India. In the light of this background, this paper attempts to 
evaluate the implications of global meltdown on agricultural sector of India, especially with 
respect to commodity price, investment in agriculture and in general food security of the country. 
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 Global Crises 
 The prolonged boom in house prices enjoyed by the US and other European countries 
since the early nineties right up to the end of 2006 made the people believe that house prices may 
only go up, leading to massive amounts of lending by banks for purchase of house to those who 
did not have even steady income, and who were actually sub-prime borrowers because of the high 
risk of defaults. Since risk-distributing new financial products1 enabled banks to sell off (at a 
discount) their loan mortgages to investment funds, the banks did not worry about defaulting of 
sub-prime loans as these derivatives had spread the risk and the funds were earning on the 
discounts (Swamy, 2010). During 2003-07, the US economy was booming due to loose monetary 
policy and low interest rates, which led to rise in global international trade due to surge in US 
imports. However, in August 2007, a mild recession hit the US economy, which was enough to 
trigger and cascade bankruptcies in Investment Funds. In fact, the housing bubble – part of a 
massive borrowing binge in the US and European countries by households and financial 
institutions – was fuelled by the easy money policies of their central banks and inflows of funds 
from capital surplus countries such as China, Japan, Germany and oil exporters (Acharya, 2009). 
Since big exporting nations sold their products to US and European consumers and then parked 
their surpluses in these Government securities, there was massive increase in borrowings by the 
households and financial firms and, as a result, the ratio of gross debt to GDP of US households, 
business and government more than doubled from 160 per cent in 1982 to 340 per cent in 2007. 
Further, since the rapid financial innovations spread the risks of the underlying weak credits 
throughout the Western financial system, the explosion of financial innovation led to excess 
growth of the finance industry on a weak base of shaky credit risks (Acharya, 2009). The growing 
culture of weak regulation of financial institutions and markets in US, UK and other countries 
was the main reason for this sorry affair of global financial crisis that fuelled the entire world.  
 The recession became more prominent in September 2008 when large number of 
American and European banks announced huge losses on their mortgage related to securities and 
investments. The process of financial collapse gradually gained further momentum when major 
American investment banks like Lehman Brothers collapsed and AIG2 declared bankruptcy. 
Nonetheless, other investment funds/banks like Merrill Lynch were saved through forced merger 
with banks having sound footing. Most of the blue collar workers were sub-prime loanees and 
when they became unemployed because of recession they could not repay even a fraction of the 
loan installments. Due to growing unemployment and recession, Lehman Brothers could not 
auction off the properties and they had to saddled with house properties on foreclosures of loan 
defaulters (Swamy, 2010). The bankruptcy of Lehman and others and consequent reduction in 
liquid funds resulted in collapse of stock market, which consequently affected European 
economies and US demand for goods (imports). The chain reaction of this was felt by China 
whose economic boom was export-led. The setback was also felt by the Indian economy mainly 
 because of our own perfidious financial derivatives called Participatory Notes3 (PNs) – 
compounded by an anti-national agreement with Mauritious – which allowed even $ 1 paid-up 
companies to invest in Indian stock market without capital gains tax levied to them. Although the 
Tarapore Committee on Financial Reforms strongly condemned PNs and wanted them scrapped, 
all the warnings were ignored. Since billions of dollars of money entered into the Mumbai stock 
exchange through buying and selling of shares with PNs used like cash, the PNs accounted for 60 
per cent of the foreign institutional investment (FII) funds in the stock market. At the time when 
liquidity crunch developed in US and subsequently in Europe and when interest rates rose, the 
PNs of the order of $ 60 billion were shipped out of India during the period between October 
2008 and January 2009, and this resulted in steep fall in the sensex index due to crash in stock 
market, which in turn caused financial crises in India.   
Meltdown and India 
 Although India initiated adequate measures to correct stock prices in January 2008, our 
major concern continued to remain rising inflation due to rise in commodity prices, which 
increased from 5 per cent in February 2008 to over 10 per cent by April 2008. The steep rise in 
inflation rate was seen despite the fact that Government did not change the issue prices of 
foodgrains, fertilizers, petrol, diesel, kerosene and LPG during this period. The acceleration in 
prices of oil, metals, fertilizers and foodgrains from late 2007 was mainly due to the global 
economic boom during 2002 to 2007 (Acharya, 2009). In fact, the events of September 2008 were 
marked with the collapse of Wall Street banks, freezing of bank credit flow in the West, 
worldwide liquidity crunch, precipitation of recessionary forces in the US, Europe and Japan and 
consequent liquidity shock/crunch in India as foreign institutional investors started withdrawing 
their money, resulting in drying up of loans from foreign banks and vanishing of credit for 
foreign trade. The outflow of foreign capital and drop in export earnings had an implication for 
the exchange rate of rupee. However, RBI took every possible measure to avoid any currency 
crisis by checking the slide in the value of rupee. In fact, the economic performance of India was 
substantially affected by the global crisis as the economic growth of India slowed down to 5-6 per 
cent in the second half of the financial year 2008-09, which actually averaged 9 per cent during 
the previous five years. It is to be noted that when India was experiencing drop in inflation rate 
due to sharp fall in global commodity prices, food prices in India still remained quite high. 
Further, the recession after September 2008 saw lose of thousands of jobs due to sharp fall in 
exports from India with respect to gems and jewelry, garments, leather production and footwear. 
It is to be noted that the UNDP Administrator, Kemal Dervis, had already warned in October 
2008 that the effect of the financial crisis could reduce demand for developing countries' exports, 
as well as the availability of credit and foreign direct investment to finance projects. Therefore, 
the developing countries were suggested to come out with strong mix of social and economic 
policies to stimulate productive public and private investment that sustain inclusive growth. The 
 estimates reported in September 2008 by the UN World Food Program revealed that there are 850 
million chronically hungry people in the world, whereas the World Bank estimates reported that 
the number of poor increased by at least 100 million as a result of the food and fuel crises. 
According to its November 2008 report, the poorest households were "forced to switch from more 
expensive to cheaper and less nutritional foodstuffs, or cut back on total caloric intake altogether, 
face weight loss and severe malnutrition." The rise in fuel and food prices not only affected poor 
in India but also in China. The 2008 Global Hunger Index of the IFPRI already includes India to 
have alarming levels of people suffering from hunger.  
 It is to be noted that India has large geography and economy and agriculture is a crucial 
sector of the country. Therefore, there is much challenge and also much opportunity to produce 
and distribute and stabilize our food prices, besides playing a significant role in international 
market. At the time when the recessionary forces are affecting the economy of several developed 
and developing countries, our national agricultural policy has to be realistic, which necessitates 
integration and reforming of our economic and trade policies. Further, since USA has been trying 
hard to push the WTO reforms in its favour to facilitate the US and EU agriculture and food 
exports to Indian markets, there is need for India to have reciprocal policy. Already recession has 
created such a situation where our farmers are hard hit by credit crisis, low demand for their 
produce and also low stages of export markets for our food products. 
Recession and Indian Agriculture 
 There has been every possible indication that the growth in Indian processed food sector 
may not be very significant and so in the case of exports with respect to foodgrains and processed 
food, especially in the next couple of years or so. Interestingly, while on one hand there has been 
virtual ban on foodgrain exports, the raw sugar, on the other hand, is subjected to zero import 
tariff. This has led to widespread protest by the sugar industry and there is fear that the area under 
sugarcane can be further reduced owing to “free” imports of raw sugar. Since sugar is a critical 
daily item of consumption for the vast population, there is obviously a need to have adequate 
control on the domestic prices on all essential commodities of common consumption, including 
sugar. The present and the futures trading in agricultural commodities have to be controlled to 
avoid further speculation in these commodities. India needs to have a stable price regime with a 
view to keep the common man away from the perception that economic recession will create a 
gloom in the growth of food sector. At the time when global economic recession is yet to take 
back foot, the growth prospects for Indian agricultural sector would depend on: (a) greater 
investment in rural infrastructure in the form connectivity of road and water management, (b) 
greater emphasis on commercially applicable research and development in agriculture, (c) 
improvements in primary education and health cover to bring greater returns in terms of 
agricultural productivity, (d) overcoming deficiencies in rural credit delivery system, (e) greater 
public and private spending in agriculture, etc. (Acharya, 2009).  
  Though global economic slowdown has not adversely impacted Indian economy as 
compared to more closely globally integrated economies of developed countries, there is some 
evidence of job losses in India in the exports of goods sector owing to recession. The recession, in 
general, has affected GDP growth in India. For instance, the GDP at factor cost in India declined 
from 9.7 per cent in the third quarter of 2007-08 to 5.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008-09 
with a make up in the same to 7.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2009-10 (Table 1). This is 
despite the fact that the interim budget presented on 16 February 2009 spoke of a nominal GDP 
growth of 11 percent in 2009-10. The decline in GDP growth with respect to Agriculture and 
allied sector was sharper and it fell from 4.7 per cent in 2007-08 to 1.6 per cent in 2008-09 and 
further to -0.2 per cent in the first half of 2009-10. 
Table 1: Quarterly Growth Rates at GDP at Constant 2004-05 Prices in India 
(in per cent) 
Sector 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
 AN Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 AN Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 AN Q1 Q2 
Agriculture, Forestry 
& Fishing 
4.7 3.1 3.9 8.7 2.1 1.6 3.2 2.4 -1.4 3.3 -0.2 2.4 0.9 
GDP at Factor Cost 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.7 8.5 6.7 7.6 7.5 6.2 5.8 7.2 6.1 7.9 
Source: CSO 
 
 As for impact of slowdown, the Rural Marketing Association of India conducted a study 
between July and December 2008 on India’s rural markets and found no evidence of a slowdown 
on those who earn their livelihood from agriculture (Debroy, 2009). Further, the 11th Five Year 
Plan (2007-12) document mentions that the incremental employment growth between 2000 and 
2005 was 46.72 million, which encompassed 8.84 million jobs in agriculture, 8.64 million in 
manufacturing, 6.44 million in construction, 10.70 million in trade, hotels and restaurants, 4.04 
million in transport, storage and communications, 3.12 million in financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services and 4.59 million in community, social and personal services, implying 
major growth in employment in unorganized sector. Since bulk of the employment creation has 
occurred in other sectors than in agriculture, these sectors are, therefore, likely to suffer from the 
slowdown. Further, according to Mahajan (2009), the economic slowdown in recent times do not 
indicate any job loss in the food and agricultural sector as the jobs involved in the production, 
procurement, transport, storage, processing and retailing of cereals, oilseeds and pulses remained 
intact – whether the volumes are due to domestic production being exported or due to imports. 
This is particularly true in the case of processing units. Since the Indian food processing industry5 
exports commodities like basmati rice, pulses, herbs, meat, fruits and vegetables, there is hardly 
any adverse affect of slowdown on their demand, and, rather these products have shown robust 
demand throughout the world even during the period of global meltdown. This is an indication of 
the fact that investments in food and agricultural industry are not at all affected by the economic 
slowdown. In this context, even Debroy (2009) has mentioned that though there stand indirect 
impacts of global prices and trade policy, the problems relating to agriculture are nothing to do 
 with global slowdown as agriculture sector has somewhat different entity in India. However, a 
counter argument put forward by Ghosh (2009) is that the global crisis, accompanied by changes 
in employment and relative prices, has adversely impacted three sections of the Indian 
population, which encompass cultivators, migrant workers and home-based women workers. Not 
only this, it has several implications with respect to food security of the country that happens to 
be already at stake. In fact, cultivators in India have been facing agrarian crisis for the past one-
decade or so despite rise in international crop prices. The problems concerning farming system in 
India are multifarious and mainly include weather related problems like less reliable monsoon, 
frequent draught or floods, problems of soil degeneration, lack of insurance and institutional 
credit, problems relating to inputs, lack of marketing facilities and high crop prices volatility. 
These problems have led to dwindling growth in GDP with respect to agriculture and allied 
sector, which fluctuated heavily over the past two decades and even became negative in 2002-03 
and 2009-10, and kept decelerating during the period coinciding with the worldwide economic 
slowdown (Table 2). 
Table 2: Annual Average Overall GDP Growth Rate and Agriculture Growth Rate in India 
(in per cent) 
Five Year Plans/ Years Overall GDP growth rate Agriculture & Allied Sectors 
 (at constant prices)@  
Seventh Plan (1985-90) 6.0 3.2 
Annual Plan (1990-92) 3.4 1.3 
Eighth Plan (1992-97) 6.7 4.7 
Ninth Plan (1197-2002) 5.5 2.1 
Tenth Plan (2002-07) 7.6 2.3 
2002-03 3.8 -7.2 
2003-04 8.5 10.0 
2004-05 7.5 0.0 
 (at 2004-05 prices)  
2005-06 9.5 5.2 
2006-07 9.7 3.7 
2007-08 9.2 4.7 
2008-09 6.7 1.6 
2009-10 7.2 -0.2 
 Source: CSO 
Note: @ - Growth rates prior to 2001 based on 1993-94 prices and from 2000-01 onwards based on new  
                 series at 1999-2000 prices 
 
 It is interesting to note that despite global economic slowdown, the demand for cereals 
remained significantly high in India. Although income elasticity of demand for the population of 
India has been declining for cereals and nearing to zero, the low income groups still show 
positive income elasticity of demand for cereals (Mahajan, 2009). As a result, the demand for 
cereals has little tendency to decline even if average income falls marginally as it is expected that 
under such circumstances people will switch over to basic foods at the expense of other items of 
consumption. This not only ensures higher demand for farm produce but also significantly high 
demand for labour in agriculture. It is to be noted that 80 per cent of the farmers in India are 
 either small or marginal and they hardly produce any marketable surplus with marginal 
dependence of hired labour. The remaining 20 per cent of the farmers encompassing medium and 
large farmers produce 80 per cent of the marketable surplus of wheat and rice with significantly 
high dependence on hired labour. In the states like Punjab and Haryana, the demand for labour 
has outstripped supply and in these states labourers are seen to negotiate wages on per acre 
contractual basis rather than daily rates. This has created shortage of labour, which could be 
partly attributed to the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme that 
offer work opportunities to them within their village. This is a reflection of the fact that 
employment of village labour has remained unaffected during the period of slowdown and rather 
their demand has increased in recent times because of their better bargaining power. 
Indian Agriculture and Price Volatility 
Though extremely volatile crop prices follow an international pattern, the major reasons 
for the volatility of output prices associated with rising input prices in India can be traced in 
government attempts to reduce fertilizer subsidies and deregulation of supply of inputs like seeds 
and pesticides. During the period of global economic recession, the volatility in crop prices 
became much worse as it compounded the problems of cash crop growers. Although global 
primary commodity prices rose dramatically upward in 2007 and the first half of 2008, a collapse 
in the same was notices thereafter, leading to wiping out whatever gain in prices occurred. 
Obviously, the farmers, who produced cash crops hardly had any benefit from such a short-lived 
price boom (Ghosh, 2009). The farmers producing cash crops saw lower prices on offer for their 
produce despite rise in food prices. This held particularly true for cultivators of cotton and 
oilseeds who saw crash in prices of these crops during the period of global meltdown, which were 
rising just a year ago before economic slowdown caught up with the world. The farmers, who 
preferred to cultivate cotton and oilseeds when their prices were quite high, have now been facing 
a complex kind of situation where costs and prices configuration stand entirely different, and this 
has serious implications as it could make the cultivation process financially completely unviable 
(Ghosh, 2009). Further, during the period of slowdown when overall prices remained stagnant, 
the food prices continued to increase so much so that foodgrain prices went up by more than 10 
per cent between April 2008 and March 2009, which solely cannot be blamed on higher 
procurement prices as the prices of pulses, not covered by public procurement, also went up 
sharply during this period. Even the prices of fruits, vegetables, eggs, fish and meat, etc. 
increased, though not as sharply as in the case of foodgrains. It was only in the case of edible oils 
that prices declined due to crash in world prices of oilseeds. On the other hand, the prices of non-
food primary product hardly changed. While the prices of fibers like cotton, jute and silk 
remained unchanged, there was 5 per cent fall in the prices of oilseeds, which obviously affected 
the producers of cash crops. This was despite the fact that the farmers paid more for fertilizers 
and pesticides, which saw more than 5 per cent rise in their prices. 
 As for the food sector, the major cause of concern is the 10 per cent rise in wholesale 
price of cereals between December 2007 and December 2008 period as this has resulted in 
reduction in real income of all urban households and a large segment of rural population 
encompassing landless households and small and marginal farmers who are net buyers of cereals 
(Mahajan, 2009). In order to improve domestic supply of pulses and keep their prices in check, 
the Government of India has extended zero customs duty for one more year with respect to the 
import of pulses and even extended ban on its exports till March 2010. Similarly, the government 
reduced import duties on edible oils to keep their prices low. As a safety measure, India imported 
5.60 million tonnes of edible oil during 2007-08 to keep their prices in check in domestic market. 
This cautioned Indian consumers when the food economy of several developing countries was 
jeopardized during the period of economic slowdown.  
Falling Global Commodity Prices 
 It is to be noted that with the onset of the global recession, international commodity 
prices with respect to non-energy agricultural beverages and food, fat and oil, and also grains fell 
from 2008 to 2009 with recovery thereafter. Some of the beverage and food items like coffee, tea, 
coconut oil, copra, groundnut oil, palm oil, soybean, barley, maize, etc. in particular showed steep 
fall in their international prices during the time of recession (Table 3).  
Table 3: International Commodity Prices for Non-Energy Agriculture Beverages, Food, Fats and  
               Oils, Grains, Other Food and Fertilizers (2008-2010) 
 
Annual Average Commodity Unit Jan-Dec 2008 Jan-Dec 2009 Jan-Mar 2010 
Agriculture Beverages     
    Cocoa  b/ ¢/kg 257.7 288.9 329.9 
    Coffee  b/ ¢/kg 232.1 164.4 150.8 
    Tea, Kolkata b/ ¢/kg 225.5 251.5 220.9 
Food Fats and Oil     
    Coconut oil b/ $/ mt 1224 725 834 
    Copra      $/ mt 816 480 557 
    Groundnut oil b/ $/ mt 2131 1184 1359 
    Palm oil b/ $/ mt 949 683 808 
    Palmkarnel oil     $/ mt 1130 700 922 
    Soybean meal b/ $/ mt 424 408 369 
    Soybean oil b/ $/ mt 1258 849 917 
    Soybeans b/ $/ mt 523 437 417 
Grains     
    Barley b/ $/ mt 200.5 128.3 144.3 
    Maize b/ $/ mt 223.1 165.5 162.7 
    Rice, Thailand, 5% b/ $/ mt 650.2 580.0 536.2 
    Sorghum      $/ mt 207.8 151.1 156.9 
Wheat, US b/ $/ mt 326.0 224.1 195.4 
Other Food     
    Bananas EU     $/ mt 1188 1145 1020 
    Bananas US b/ $/ mt 844 847 781 
    Sugar EU b/ ¢/kg 69.69 52.44 46.38 
Fertilizers     
    DAP b/ $/ mt 967.2 323.1 464.8 
    Phosphate rock b/ $/ mt 345.6 121.7 102.1 
    Urea b/ $/ mt 492.7 249.6 281.0 
Source: Commodity Price Data, World Bank 
Notes: b/ included in the non-energy index (2000=100); $ = US dollar; ¢ = US Cent; kg = kilogram 
  The period between 2008 and 2009 saw not only drop in prices of food and beverages but 
also input prices like fertilizers. In fact, huge inflows of speculative finance into the commodity 
futures market led to sharp increases in commodity prices in 2008, which following the financial 
meltdown, came down even more sharply in the subsequent year. Such sharp fluctuations in 
agricultural commodity prices obviously adversely affect peasantry in developing world. The 
peasantries of developing world are exposed to high risks of international price fluctuations 
owing to the policies of trade liberalization followed by them and the agricultural sector of these 
economics that has become more export-oriented. 
Coping Strategies  
 The fall in GDP growth to 5.3 per cent in the thirds quarter (October-December 2008), 
negative rates of 2.2 per cent and 0.20 per cent, respectively, with respect to agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, decline in export and imports by 15.9 per cent and 18.2 per cent, 
respectively, in dollar terms in January 2009 as compared to January 2008, etc. are some of the 
indications of adverse affect of slowdown on Indian economy. The coping strategies to counter 
the impact of slowdown include increasing public investment in agriculture, extending protection 
against price crashes of crops through price support and increased import tariffs, extending 
employment guarantee for more number of days than stipulated in NREG scheme, providing 
employment guarantee in urban areas, enhancing state intervention, providing relief packages for 
crisis affected sectors, etc. This means that a significant amount of public expenditure is needed 
for the creation of jobs and raising purchasing power of the rural and urban population. Equally 
important is to raise public investment, especially for the development of agriculture, social 
sector and infrastructure, aside from generating employment in rural and urban areas of India.  
Conclusions 
 Although the global economic downturn has resulted in large-scale job losses and mass 
unemployment in many export-oriented sectors, the situation in food and agricultural sector has 
remained stable with little job losses. However, since agricultural sector in India has somewhat 
different entity, the impact of global crisis in this sector is seen to have percolated in varied 
forms. During the period of slowdown when there stood virtual ban on foodgrain exports, the raw 
sugar was subjected to zero import tariff, leading to widespread protest by the sugar industry. The 
“free” imports of raw sugar raised concerns regarding cultivation of sugarcane in the country. 
Adequate control obviously needs to be exercised on the domestic prices of all essential 
commodities of common consumption, including sugar. Interestingly, despite decline in income 
elasticity of demand for cereals in India, the low-income groups still show positive income 
elasticity of demand for cereals, indicating little tendency of decline in demand for cereals even if 
income falls marginally. This not only ensures higher demand for farm produce but also 
significantly high demand for labour in agriculture. However, the global economic recession has 
 certainly compounded the problems of cash crop growers as the farmers producing cash crops 
saw lower prices on offer for their produce despite rise in food prices. Further, though prices of 
edible oil in India declined due to crash in world prices of oilseeds, the price of non-food primary 
products hardly changed. Nonetheless, the major cause of concern for the food sector of India is 
the 10 per cent rise in wholesale prices of cereals between December 2007 and December 2008 
period as this has resulted in reduction in real income of all urban and rural household. Although 
government has resorted to initiate some measures to check prices, there still stand various other 
measures to be initiated to safeguard Indian economy from global economic slowdown.    
End Notes 
1. The new derivatives created portfolios of loans extended by banks and of mortgages of 
different risks and maturities. Banks were in favour of this as they got fresh liquid funds 
in place of mortgages (Swamy, 2010). 
 
2. American International Group, Inc. (AIG) is an American insurance corporation. AIG 
suffered from a liquidity crisis when its credit ratings were downgraded below "AA" 
levels in September 2008. The United States Federal Reserve Bank on September 16, 
2008, created an $85 billion credit facility to enable the company to meet increased 
collateral obligations consequent to the credit rating downgrade, in exchange for the 
issuance of a stock warrant to the Federal Reserve Bank for 79.9% of the equity of AIG.  
 
3. The PNs is a piece of paper issued by designated financial institutions abroad such as 
Fidelity Investments and Morgan Stanley, which does not carry any detail except the 
money worth, and can be purchased by anyone with cash even without disclosing to any 
authority the name and the source of the funds. That piece of paper was acceptable for 
transactions in the Indian stock market for buying and selling shares as also short-selling. 
 
4. The economic slowdown has not affected investments in food and agricultural processing 
industry. The sector is expected to attract fresh investments of over Rs.5,000 crore in the 
next 2-3 years. The Ministry of Food Processing Industries has received 4 expressions of 
interest after announcing the revised Mega Food Park Scheme in October 2008. 
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